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Abstract.  This paper argues that media and communications theory, as with cultural and creative 
industries analysis, can benefit from a deeper understanding of economic growth theory. Economic growth 
theory is elucidated in the context of both cultural and media studies and with respect to modern Chinese 
economic development. Economic growth is a complex evolutionary process that is tightly integrated with 
socio-cultural and political processes. This paper seeks to explore this mechanism and to advance cultural 
theory from an erstwhile political-economy perspective to one centred about the co-evolutionary dynamics 
of economic and socio-political systems. A generic model is presented in which economic and social 
systems co-evolve through the origination, adoption and retention of new ideas, and in which the creative 
industries are a key part of this process. The paper concludes that digital media capabilities are a primary 
source of economic development.   
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Introduction 
This is perhaps an unusual article to appear in a journal of communication, even allowing 
for a special issue on creative industries, in that it is ostensibly based in modern economic 
growth theory. Yet, this paper will argue that economic growth theory has more direct 
relevance to media, communications and cultural theory than political-economy theory, 
which is often the default ‘economic’ foundation. Furthermore, this connection is 
exemplified in the specific context of the economic development of China.   
The underlying theoretical connection is, however, widely overlooked on both 
sides. Media and communication studies tend to focus on cultural and socio-political 
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factors and the effects of change in information and communication technologies, yet 
routinely ignore the implications of economic dynamics. Economists, on the other hand, 
tend to regard media and communication as minor issues, instead focusing on savings and 
investment, technological change and factor productivity, trade and appropriate economic 
institutions. In consequence, there remains little appreciation of not only the affects of 
economic growth and development on media and communications industries, but also of 
the role that the media, cultural and creative industries play in the process of economic 
growth and development.  
This paper seeks to reconnect these two domains in order to emphasise the role of 
media, communication, cultural and creative industries in facilitating economic evolution 
and socio-cultural adaptation to economic dynamics. This connection is important in all 
growing economies, yet I shall argue that it is of greatest significance in economic 
systems experiencing high and sustained rates of economic growth and structural change. 
This occurs both in facilitating the process of individual and socio-cultural adaptation to 
transformative economic dynamics as well as in driving the information and service 
components of economic value added over the shift from creative industries to ‘creative 
economy’ (Howkins, 2001; Keane & Hartley, 2006), or what Keane (2007) calls: from 
‘made in China’ to ‘designed in China’.         
The economic growth and transformation of China1 over the past three decades 
has been astonishing.2 Nothing like it has ever happened so fast, for such a sustained 
period, and for such a large population. The growth rate of GDP of almost 10 percent for 
more than two decades has transformed the nation, lifted millions out of poverty, and 
engendered the largest urban migration in world history. This paper briefly reviews the 
theory of economic growth and development and then connects this to China’s recent 
experience before examining the role of media, cultural and creative industries in this 
process. The reason for this detour into the foundations of economic growth theory is that 
economic transformation of this magnitude and scope is not simply economic growth (i.e. 
an expansion of extant activities) but is a process of systemic transformation from within 
known as economic evolution (Metcalfe, 1998; Dopfer & Potts, 2008). Economic 
                                            
1 All China references idem refer to the People’s Republic of China. 
2 Tisdell and Chai (1997), Berthelemy and Demurger (2000), Wu (2000), Riedel, Jin & Gao(2007). 
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evolution, in turn, co-evolves with the socio-cultural system, and it is here that we shall 
locate the significance of the media, cultural and creative industries (Potts, 2007, 2009).    
   
The economic theory of China’s recent economic growth 
Much of the literature that intersects economic development and cultural, media and 
communication studies is based in political-economy theory that seeks to emphasize 
power relationships and explanatory factors associated with socio-cultural and political 
structures (Garnham, 1990; Mosco, 1996; McChesney, 2000). However, while most 
media, cultural and communication scholars are well versed in political economy theory, 
this rarely extends to mainstream economic theory including ‘new growth theory’. It will 
be useful, therefore, to review the theory of economic growth and its evidential support in 
China before considering how the cultural and creative industries in general, and media 
and digital literacy in particular, fit into this framework.     
The economic approach to the study of growth is based on the construction and 
testing of growth models. These models work by isolating a particular set of factors – 
such as natural resources, investment, education, new technology or technology transfer, 
new markets, factor productivity, entrepreneurship, demand, institutions, etc – and then 
building models to explain the mechanism by which these factors contribute to economic 
growth. These models are then tested against various data sets and form the core of 
growth theory.  
 
The market growth model: comparative advantage and trade 
The foundation of all economic models of growth is built on the insights of the Classical 
economists (Adam Smith, David Ricardo, et al.,) who connected the extent of market 
trade with the prospects for economic growth via increasing specialization and division of 
labour.3 The model is simple: economic output is maximized when each person, firm, 
                                            
3 The classical economists also introduced the idea of factors of production – land, labour and capital – and used this 
model to explain the distribution of income (e.g. Ricardo on rent, Marx on wages and profit). Yet in doing so, they 
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region or nation specializes in producing what they have a comparative advantage4 in 
and then trading for the rest. The more a nation specializes in producing what it has a 
comparative advantage in, and the greater the size of the markets it can access, the greater 
will be its output. Specialization and trade thus creates wealth and the continued pursuit 
of new specializations and new trading opportunities creates economic growth.        
Three points should be noted. First, all nations have comparative advantage in 
some things, yet it is not always obvious what these are (Hausmann & Rodrik, 2003). The 
discovery of comparative advantage is thus itself part of the market process as led by 
entrepreneurial experimentation (Kirzner, 1997). Second, comparative advantage is rarely 
a permanent feature of an economy, but a product of a particular matrix of resource 
endowments, prices, skills, infrastructure and institutions; as they change, so does 
comparative advantage. For example, in the 19th century the UK had a comparative 
advantage in textile manufacture, but no longer: now China does. Third, the possibilities 
of specialization are limited by the extent of the market. That is, restrictions on trade 
reduce the scope of specialization and thus the potential for growth. 
All three factors can be readily observed in China’s economic performance over 
the past three decades (Chow, 1997). First, the economic growth of China coincides with 
the opening of the economy to global trade and the rejection of the autarkic economic 
model of self-reliance. Thus even though a population of over one billion people would 
seem to provide a suitably large domestic market, and therefore seemingly no need to 
trade extensively with the rest of the world, the opening up of China to world markets has 
had a profound effect on production and consumption everywhere, resulting in a vast 
shift in the global division of labour and the international patterns of specialization in 
production. Second, while it may seem obvious that China’s wage structure affords it a 
comparative advantage in the manufacture of labour intensive goods, the actual pattern of 
production is more subtle and reflects the entrepreneur-led discovery of many particular 
                                                                                                                                  
were modeling what JS Mill called the ‘stationary state’. They were concerned with the existence of wealth and its 
distribution, not with how it grew. 
4 The theory of comparative advantage is a foundation of modern economics and is to be distinguished from the notion 
of absolute advantage. By definition, every nation has a comparative advantage in something when the opportunity 
costs of producing one product compared to another differ. Each country should then specialize in producing that which 
it has the ‘least relative opportunity cost’. There will always be scope for gains from trade, even when one nation is 
absolutely worse at producing all products compared to another.    
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product niches, some of which are highly capital intensive (e.g. construction steel, cotton 
undergarments, cigarette lighters) (Kynge, 2006). Third, as China grows through 
learning-by-doing and gains in productivity, wages will rise and current comparative 
advantages will no longer hold. New production possibilities and new markets will reflect 
changing patterns of specialization. Examples of this occur as firms move up the value 
chain in existing industries, e.g. making whole cars rather than just car parts, but also in 
the development of entirely new industries, e.g. digital animation (Keane, 2007).  
Economists tend to emphasize the role of entrepreneurship, enterprise and low 
barriers to trade and the absence of market distortions as the prime factors driving this 
growth process. However, it is apparent that the free flow of information about 
opportunities is also at the core of this process. Communications and media thus enter as 
a factor that facilitates the process of economic growth by supplying, disseminating and 
interpreting changed information about economic opportunities. This does not imply a 
political-economy interpretation of communications and media in terms of countervailing 
power. Rather, it recognizes that markets are information systems and the greater the 
quantity and quality of information in an economy the greater possibility for discovery of 
new opportunities and specializations in both production and consumption (Cowen, 2002; 
Potts, in press-b).                     
 
Neoclassical and new growth theory 
Modern economic growth theory is based on the neoclassical growth model.5 While the 
‘classical’ model above emphasized specialization, trade and entrepreneurial discovery, 
the neoclassical growth model is a supply-side aggregate production function-based 
model that explains growth in output in terms of growth in inputs, as in (1) below:   
Y  = f(K, L)      (∆K = S = I)          (1) 
This says that output (Y) is a product of combinations of input factors, specifically capital 
and labour (K, L). The relation between inputs and outputs is described by technology: 
                                            
5 This model arrived mid-20th century with the work of Harrod, Domar, Swann and Solow due to the new 
understandings, data and models of aggregate economies ushered in by the Keynesian revolution. 
 6
f(.). To explain increase in output (∆Y) or growth, you must explain the increase in the 
crucial input, capital stock (K). The theory is that investment (I), which is equal to 
savings (S), explains change in the capital stock (∆K). In neoclassical growth theory, the 
level of income is determined by the equilibrium level of capital stock, which is itself 
determined by the level of savings and investment.  
Countries with high savings (or access to other countries savings as foreign 
investment) will accumulate and maintain more capital, and will thus be wealthier. This 
model fits most evidence well: e.g. Japan, Switzerland during the 20th century. The 
economies of Taiwan, Korea and Singapore had high savings rates of between 25–40% 
during the 1960s-1980s, which explains their ‘growth miracles’. Since the late 1970s, 
China’s savings rate is estimated at between 40–60% of household income. This is 
extremely high compared to most nations (the OECD average is closer to 15%) and is in 
significant part due to the high uncertainty associated with Socialist provision of public 
education, health, income security and retirement provisions, thus necessitating unusually 
high levels of household savings as a hedge. Furthermore, the relatively underdeveloped 
state of capital and financial markets combined with extensive government holdings of 
companies tends to significantly increase the level of operating income that is retained 
and reinvested by companies, rather than being disbursed to shareholders. According to 
neoclassical growth theory, China’s growth can be explained by its high savings rate. 
Rather, the puzzle is why China has not been growing even faster, as the models predict 
that it should be growing at closer to 15–20% per annum, not 10% (Riedel et al 2007).6 
However, this theory only explains equilibrium levels of income due to savings and 
investment, but does not explain continual growth, as that would require a continuingly 
increasing savings rate. Growth in factors of production provides only a partial 
explanation of economic growth (Li, Liu & Rebelo., 1998).  
The second generation of neoclassical growth models (called ‘new growth theory’ 
or the endogenous growth model) continues with the same method, but with a renewed 
definition of capital (Romer, 1990; Jones, 1995). Instead, capital is modeled more 
                                            
6 There are two explanations of why China is not growing as fast as its savings rate would suggest. First, China has 
instead been financing other nation’s savings deficits, notably the US through the purchase of Government bonds. 
Second, the allocation of savings and investment may not be efficient due to the relatively underdeveloped state of 
Chinese capital and financial markets (Fung, Ho & Zhu 2005).  
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broadly as knowledge. By allowing ‘knowledge spillovers’ or ‘non-rivalry’, endogenous 
growth models generate continuous growth. Further, they predict that the higher the level 
of both education (human capital) and population, the higher the growth rate by allowing 
a positive feedback from more educated people to knowledge production. A given level 
of investment can maintain continuous economic growth when it is directed toward the 
creation of new ideas by allowing a proportion of the work force to specialize in 
producing ‘ideas’ or ‘knowledge’: the larger the proportion, the higher the growth rate.  
Both neoclassical and new growth models imply that the source of China’s 
extraordinary recent growth can, in significant part, be explained through a combination 
of high levels of savings and investment coupled with investment in human capital and 
technology transfer (Li et al., 1998, Berthelemy & Demurger, 2000; Wu, 2000; Wang & 
Yao, 2003; Riedel et al., 2007). When coupled with the effects of globalization we obtain 
a fairly standard account of China’s growth performance that accords with the experience 
of other East Asian nations such as Korea or Singapore since the 1970s or of Western 
Europe and Japan since the 1950s.  
At first sight, it would seem that the cultural, creative, media and communications 
industries have little relevance to such growth processes. However, the central weakness 
of production function-based models of economic growth is that they neglect to account 
for the role of coordination services involved in changing industrial composition, factor 
mobility, and changing patterns of work, education, career and consumption possibilities. 
Instead, neoclassical growth theory assumes that changes in organization and 
coordination occur instantaneously and without cost (in response to price incentives) and 
that demand everywhere rises to equal supply. In an economy where incomes and 
opportunities are static, such coordination services have little value. However, this is 
decidedly not the case in China (Tisdell & Chai, 1997). A continuously growing 
economy thus induces demand for the sorts of information and coordination services 
provided by cultural, creative and communications industries (Potts, 2009). This notion 
of what we might call ‘coordination spillovers’ has been widely overlooked in standard 
growth models, yet may be suitably incorporated in endogenous growth models by 
widening the definition of ‘knowledge producers’ beyond that of R&D scientists and 
such like to include ‘information and coordination producers’ whose activities lead to 
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‘coordination spillovers’. Just as ‘knowledge spillovers’ in endogenous growth theory 
lead to the increasing returns to investment that drive continuous economic growth, the 
same argument may be extended to the role of the creative and communications sectors 
with respect to ongoing adaptation to the new opportunities that economic growth 
presents (Liao, 2006).                  
 
Institutions, innovation and the growth of knowledge 
Recently, economists have begun to focus increasing attention on the role of institutions 
(or the ‘rules of the game’) in explaining economic growth (e.g. North, 1990). These 
‘rules’ refer to the behavioral, legal, political and socio-cultural institutions that define 
the possibilities and costs of economic action and coordination. Countries with ‘good’ 
institutions, it is argued, are capable of economic growth, and not otherwise. ‘Good 
institutions’ are defined as rules that facilitate the accumulation of assets and promote the 
growth of trade and enterprise. These have been widely empirically investigated using 
historical data and include: (1) effective legal system and the rule of law; (2) effective 
protection of property (both physical and intellectual); (3) extensive markets, including 
financial markets, and the reach of market coordination. Good institutions thus provide 
incentives toward wealth creation, entrepreneurship and investment. Bad institutions, on 
the other hand, lead to incentives for resources to be directed toward rent-seeking or other 
zero or negative-sum activities. The institutional model of economic growth thus argues 
that economic growth will occur ‘naturally’ when sufficient institutional conditions are 
present, but not otherwise. The primary role of government economic policy is thus to get 
these institutional conditions right.    
 China again presents an interesting study because in many respects it has weak 
institutions with respect to property rights, financial markets, rule of law, and suchlike. 
However, the relevant comparison is not between, say contemporary China and the US or 
UK, but between China now compared to China pre-1978. Furthermore, the growth 
drivers within China have overwhelmingly come from those parts of the economy that 
were subject to increased market freedoms and decentralization, notably for example the 
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southern provinces (Cai, Wand & Du., 2002; Riedel et al., 2007).7 Kynge (2006) also 
presents the case that significant sources of enterprise growth occurred outside of the 
formal legal and political system. Such institutional factors thus have significant 
explanatory power in explaining differential growth within China (Herrmann-Pillath, 
2006).    
 An example of how institutional factors affect economic growth comes from the 
significance of guanxi in Chinese business. Many business-people must invest sometimes 
considerable resources in the development of networks as sources of reputation and trust, 
and access to information and contracts. The existence of guanxi is a response to ‘market 
failure’ in information and coordination, including financial markets. Guanxi thus creates 
an institution that distinguishes insiders from outsiders and restricts enterprise 
competition and factor mobility to those inside the networks (Braendle, Gasser & Noll., 
2005). For ‘insiders’ invested in such networks there are considerable incentives to 
maintain this institution and the rents it provides. Yet from a public good perspective, 
such networks may crowd-out development of more open and transparent institutions of 
information, reputation and coordination. Again, the role of cultural and creative 
industries enters with respect to the provision of alternate and potentially more efficient 
mechanisms of information coordination and social networks (Currid 2007; Potts, 
Cunningham, Hartley & Ormerod., 2008). 
So far, we have the extent of markets and the accumulation of capital and 
knowledge as the source of economic growth, and good institutions as a precondition. 
Yet the major part of the story of economic growth is the growth of knowledge through 
innovation. This is often simply treated as technological change. However, the process by 
which technological change originates and is adopted into the economy is complex. This 
process has been intensively investigated by Schumpeterian and evolutionary economists 
(Metcalfe, 1998; Dopfer & Potts, 2008).8  
The difference between neoclassical and Schumpeterian growth models lies in 
their attention to internal processes. Neoclassical models are aggregate models in which 
                                            
7 Potts (in press-b) argues that the effects of globalization and its institutional transformations can in part explain the 
global rise of the creative industries. 
8 Following Joseph Schumpeter’s 1912 Theory of Economic Development which introduced the significance of the 
entrepreneur, and his 1942 work on the dynamics of market capitalist: Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.  
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technological change occurs everywhere at once. In Schumpeterian models, new 
technologies are associated with a trajectory that changes the structure of the economy 
through the origination, adoption and retention of a new idea. This inevitably leads to the 
destruction of some existing economic structure and the creation of new structure (a 
process Schumpeter called ‘creative destruction’). Furthermore, economic growth arises 
not only from new inventions, but also from new markets, new sources of supply, new 
processes, new organizations, new connections, etc. The role of markets are curiously 
absent from neoclassical growth models yet are central to Schumpeterian growth models 
because markets are the ‘information technology’ that coordinates the process of 
innovation and the disruptions it brings.    
Schumpeterian growth models are based about the concept of an innovation 
system as a way of gathering the set of factors that contribute to the growth of knowledge 
process. Components of an innovation system include universities and research institutes, 
public and private sector R&D, the education system, the technology transfer system, and 
all other organizations and institutions that influence the development, diffusion and use 
of innovations.9 The central idea is that countries with ‘good’ innovation systems will 
grow faster than countries with ‘bad’ innovation systems. Two points thus arise. First, 
relatively little is known about the Chinese innovation system and its relation to 
economic growth and development (Xue, 1997; Liu & White, 2001; Motohashi & Yun, 
2005). Second, recent work in innovation system theory has begun to emphasize the role 
of the creative industries in national and regional innovation systems in conjunction with 
the science and technology sectors (Potts, 2007, in press-a, in press-b). This extension of 
conventional innovation system analysis to include cultural and creative sectors reflects 
increasing attention to the innovation process beyond the supply-side aspect of 
origination to further include the adoption, diffusion and retention of new ideas.10 This 
process increasingly occurs in a market context that involves consumer-producer 
interactions, the development of information and communications technologies and 
cultural practices, and the ongoing development of new markets and consumer demand. 
Media and literacy (including digital literacy) are thus important components of an 
                                            
9 Lundvall (1992), Freeman (2002), Nelson (2002). 
10 Postrell (2005) offers a nice line on the distinction between style and substance in respect of adoption.  
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economy’s or society’s innovation system due to their role in the adoption and retention 
of new ideas.    
 
Economic growth processes and socio-cultural dynamics 
Economic growth is a complex multi-faceted process. Yet the central point to grasp is 
that economic growth is an open-system process that involves not just a scaling-up of 
existing economic activities but endogenous transformation in what those activities are, 
and thus continuous and ongoing re-coordination of the economic system. This is why 
markets and other knowledge and coordination institutions are central to the theory of 
economic growth. Yet that same recognition explains why economic growth is also a 
socio-cultural process that involves changes in the way people work and consume, in 
their career opportunities and prospects, in what assets they hold and prospects they 
aspire to, in where they live and what matters to them, in their skills, aspirations and 
identities, and ultimately in the way they live their lives. Economic growth changes these 
things, yet is also consequence of change in these things. Economic systems thus co-
evolve with socio-cultural systems, and it is at this intersection that the role of the cultural 
and creative industries enters simultaneously as a concern of both economic growth 
theory and socio-cultural analysis.  
Yet cultural, media and communications theory has traditionally been viewed in 
opposition to market-capitalist growth and development and has often sought to analyze 
and critique its various injustices and propagation of inequalities from a political 
economy perspective. However, what I hope the above review of economic growth 
theory has highlighted is the significant role the cultural, media and communications 
sector actually plays in the process of ongoing economic growth through its role in 
integrating and stabilizing processes of change, in facilitating the flow of information and 
ideas, and promoting the development of open systems of coordination (Cunningham, 
2006). Growth theory highlights the specific mechanisms that drive growth: namely the 
accumulation of capital and knowledge coupled with effective institutions, specifically 
the institutions of the market, and the institutions of innovation. At base, economic 
growth is a process of the origination of new ideas and their subsequent adoption and 
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retention for use as a ‘growth of knowledge’ process that is as much about socio-cultural 
dynamics as about market and industrial dynamics. The co-evolutionary association 
between socio-cultural and political dynamics, on the one hand, and economic growth 
and development on the other is a general and generic relation that is true of all growing 
economies and transforming societies. Yet several additional reasons render this 
association of particular importance to the ongoing sustainability of China’s economic 
growth over and above the sheer size, scale and global ramifications of China’s 
transformation.  
First, while China remains nominally a communist one-party political system, the 
communist economic model has substantially given way to considerable economic 
decentralization, private investment and scope for enterprise-led development. Yet many 
old economic institutions that were once well-adapted to a communist economic model 
continue to operate with increasing dysfunction in a market context. Economists regularly 
note that Chinese capital and labour market regulations are in significant need of reform 
and presently hinder economic growth (Cai et al., 2002, Fung et al., 2005). Yet the same 
point can also be made about media, information and communications regulation and 
policy. At first sight, this might seem further removed from economic growth, as these 
domains also have significant political critique and social control (e.g. ‘harmonious 
society, civil society’) dimensions. However, information freedoms also relate to 
economic freedom in the diffusion of information, ideas and knowledge that enable 
people to make effective choices by learning about opportunities, costs and benefits and 
in communicating their own economic information to others. 
Second, the film, television, video, publishing sectors serve an important function 
beyond providing journalistic information and analysis, consumer entertainment, and in 
delivering an audience for advertisers. But in a growing economy with increasing social 
mobility and opportunity, they also play a role in shaping and stabilizing shifting 
identities and aspirations. This affect is widely overlooked in economic analysis, due to 
its intangible subjectivity, and also in cultural analysis due its seeming negative 
connotation in materialism and ‘bourgeois virtues’ (cf. McCloskey, 2005). But this is of 
significance in China due to the multiple transitions that are presently occurring: e.g. 
from an agricultural to an industrial economy; from a rural economy to a dominantly 
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urban economy; from a closed economy to a broadly open economy; or from one where 
travel, and indeed all forms of mobility, was difficult and limited to one where it is easy. 
These are indeed ‘interesting times’ that are intensely buffeted from both within and 
without. These transitions have all occurred elsewhere of course, but often over much 
longer time periods and rarely all at once. The point is that while these aspects are often 
viewed exclusively as socio-cultural or political issues, they are consequences of 
economic growth and, furthermore, the extent to which they can occur smoothly in turn 
affects the ongoing rate and stability of economic transformation (Herrmann-Pillath, 
2006).  
Third, as with all growing economies, China continues to experience the rise of 
the service sector along with growth in economic importance of small and medium sized 
enterprises (Bhagwati, 1984; Metcalfe & Miles, 2000). China’s service sector is presently 
estimated at 45-50% of economic activity, compared with 70-75% for nations such as 
UK, USA, Australia, etc. China’s continued economic growth will require not just 
sustained industrial investment, but will also depend on the extent to which it can foster 
new business models and create new markets, much of which will unfold in the service 
sector and centre about small and medium sized enterprise. This is of particular relevance 
to the creative industries in China, which are both predominantly of this form (Liao, 
2006), and also often serve as conduits for innovation in business models as well as in the 
adoption and diffusion of new information and communication technologies (Potts, 2007; 
Keane & Hartley, 2006; Keane, 2007; Montgomery & Potts 2008).11                
 
Economic growth & the creative industries  
This new recognition of the complex relation between economic growth and cultural, 
media and communication industries began with the DCMS (1998) identification of the 
‘economic significance’ of the creative industries.12 Just as agriculture gave way to 
manufacturing in the first transformational phase of economic development, namely 
                                            
11 This is also of particular significance in relation to open innovation and situated creativity (Benkler 2006, Quiggin & 
Potts, 2009; Potts, Hartley, Banks, Burgess, Cobcroft, Cunningham, et al., in press). 
12 Howkins (2001), Florida (2002), Hartley (2005), Cunningham (2006). 
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industrialization, the new lesson from the frontiers of economic growth is that the service 
sector – and in particular finance, business services, information services and the creative 
industries – is the leading source of ongoing value creation into a ‘post-industrial’ future. 
Industrialization is not an end point of economic growth and development, but a further 
station along the endless frontier of knowledge growth. The question, then, is whether 
rapidly developing economies such as China, which are in a position to accelerate 
through such development phases (Keane & Hartley, 2006; Keane, 2007), can not just 
follow this line, but possibly even lead it.  
Neoclassical economic growth theory says China will specialize in low labour 
cost activities and leverage these on a global scale, which it has. But, in doing so, it has 
greatly increased its domestic income and capabilities, and thus begun to move beyond its 
erstwhile comparative advantage. This is normal and good, yet presents a common trap 
for thinking about China’s economic future. As China grows, it will not continue to 
produce the same industrial mix of goods and services that it presently does. As it grows, 
it will become different (Metcalfe, 1998). Income grows because productivity increases, 
and productivity increases because of new capital, knowledge, institutions and 
capabilities. So long as China remains globally integrated and committed to economic 
openness, China will likely continue to grow and its population will gradually but 
increasingly become ‘middle class’: they will become different, both as producers and as 
consumers. As this happens, the economic significance of the cultural, media and creative 
industries will likely expand, as has occurred in all OECD economies for which data is 
available (Potts, in press-b). 
In analysis of this general context, Potts and Cunningham (2008) have recently 
argued that four basic models can be applied to the growth relation between the creative 
industries sector and the economic system. This modeling framework was originally 
developed to discriminate cultural and creative industries policy positions in mature 
OECD economies such as Australia and the UK, but the same framework can also be 
applied to developing nations such as China. It is axiomatic that the cultural and creative 
industries produce value. But how does this interact with economic growth? These four 
models seek to discriminate between four possible answers.   
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In model 1 the cultural and creative industries have negative economic value with 
respect to growth. This is the economic welfare model (Baumol & Bowen, 1966). This 
does not say that cultural and creative industries do not produce economic value, but 
rather that these values are largely within in the realm of socio-cultural and socio-
political value, and have little or even negative economic component such that their 
viability depends upon subsidy. The cultural, creative, media and communications sector, 
in this view is of value, but it this has predominately cultural, social and political 
dimensions. Economic value is thus sacrificed in order to support and promote these 
activities. In many respects, this is the past and present Chinese position with respect to 
most cultural industries (Liao, 2006). In model 1, the growth of the cultural, media and 
communications sector comes at the cost of aggregate economic growth due to scarce 
resources transferred into this sector. 
In model 2 the cultural and creative industries are effectively just another set of 
activities, markets, organizations. They are no more or less special or significant than 
other sectors, and compete on equal terms. In this view, they produce value in proportion 
to what the market demands and require no special policy consideration. This is a 
position many entrepreneurial Chinese media and communication businesses might 
aspire to, as would many potential foreign entrants into this sector. In model 2, the 
growth of this sector has a neutral affect on the growth of the aggregate economy.   
Model 3 is the argument that the creative industries are a driver of operational 
economic activity, as measured in trade, jobs or exports. In this model, the creative 
industries drive economic growth as they create new jobs, firms and markets. They are, in 
this view, winners to be backed. Yet this is only viable in regions or nations with a 
comparative advantage in this (e.g. NY, Silicon Valley, London, Beijing etc). The 
cultural and creative industries thus drive economic growth and development through 
their increasing value added, which is itself a consequence of new technologies and 
capabilities combined with increased consumer demand for these services. Nations that 
can lead this industry can in turn leverage value by exporting these services to other 
nations (the US and the UK are presently the world’s leaders in creative content exports).    
 16
In model 4 the creative industries are generic evolutionary drivers in that they are 
involved in the growth of knowledge and the process of structural change across the 
entire economy (Higgs, Cunningham & Bakhshi., 2008). In this view, the creative 
industries are part of the innovation system and evaluated by their contribution to 
economic dynamics. In theory, this results in spillovers to the rest of the economy, both 
on the demand and supply side in the manner discussed above in relation to ‘coordination 
spillovers’ as well as through new content, business models and other innovations issuing 
from this sector. In model 4, creative industries are instigators and catalysts of new 
economic opportunities and have a similar role to basic science or education in respect of 
economic growth and development. They are, in other words, not generalized industries, 
like ship-building, but rather function as catalysts of ongoing growth and change (Potts et 
al 2008). They are invested in not as growing industries but rather as growth 
mechanisms. This is a subtle but important distinction.      
According to Potts and Cunningham (2008), recent evidence from OECD nations 
supports models 3 & 4, although does not discriminate between them. It is unclear where 
China falls with respect to these four models, and indeed how any one model might then 
break down with respect to different regional or industrial definitions of cultural or 
creative industries. Yet the upshot is that most political-economy perspectives on media 
and communications miss all four dimensions of these economic growth theory relations. 
Specifically, they fail to distinguish between models 1&2, in which growth components 
are negative or irrelevant, versus models 3&4, in which they are crucial. Political-
economy models and analysis generally fail to recognize the potential evolutionary 
significance of the information and communication industries. This is a significant 
oversight in the context of rapidly developing economies in which these sectors, markets, 
firms and industries play an increasingly important role in the process of economic and 
socio-cultural development. Modern economic growth theory thus converges on a single 
point: that the long run prospects of any economy ultimately depend on its ability to 
originate, adopt and retain new ideas. Whether as transformation technologies or 
innovation technologies, they are a crucial aspect of the process of economic growth that 
is in increasingly significant part supplied by the creative industries. This is what the 
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creative industries do, what media and communication facilitates, and what digital 
literacy achieves. This is the dynamic evolutionary service they provide.  
 
Economic development 2.0 
Potts and Cunningham (2008) argue that the creative industries fit models 3 and 4 over 
all countries for which quality data is available. They are a driver of economic growth 
and contribute to the nation’s innovation system. The further question, however, is 
whether this relationship only holds in wealthy ‘post-industrial’ nations or also extends to 
developing nations such as China (Wang, 2004; Keane, 2007). Unfortunately, aggregate 
economic data on cultural and creative industries is radically incomplete for China, as 
with most developing nations.13 Yet this thesis is still worth considering because of its 
potential implications for development policy.   
There is an instinctive tendency to think of the creative industries as associated 
with the vanguard of advanced civilizations (Hall, 1998), and in particular to associate it 
with the dominant economic and cultural cities of New York, London, Los Angeles, Paris 
and suchlike (Florida, 2002, 2008; Currid, 2007). Thus while providing content to the 
masses; it is produced by the elite, in elite places. Yet that may not continue to be so, and 
a basic test of this proposition is whether the creative industries can also play a role in the 
economic growth and development processes of developing economies.14   
Still, two reasons may immediately lead us to dismiss any significance of creative 
industries for developing economies. First, observed creative industries growth in 
developed nations may simply reflect consumer spending moving on from saturation in 
other product categories. If so, then because China’s consumers are not yet satiated with 
cars, tourism, consumer electronics, health services, etc, growth of demand for creative 
industries output may remain low. Yet while levels of consumer expenditure on creative 
                                            
13 Evidence from ICT usage (mobile phones, internet, online games etc) indicates extremely rapid growth in consumer 
demand (see Montgomery & Potts, 2008). However, sector-wide value-added or employment data is still lacking.  
14 The same urban feedback will surely occur (Krugman, 1991), such that the creative industries in China will probably 
tend to concentrate in Beijing and Shanghai due to the importance of co-location in production and the increasing 
returns process this implies. 
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industries remain low per capita in developing economies, growth rates are not, and 
particularly among young consumers. 
Second, dismissal of creative industries significance in developing nations may 
also follow if creative industries are subject to strong comparative advantage, meaning 
that some nations or regions will specialize in creative production and then export to the 
rest of the world (e.g. Scandinavian design, US films, etc). To the extent that these 
involve complex frontier technologies, it would then be unlikely that developing nations 
could effectively and competitively develop such export industries. However, neither 
aspect is compelling. There is a rapid fall in the costs of ICT and capital goods associated 
with creative industries production, coupled with significant growth in open and amateur 
production (Leadbeater, 2008). Furthermore, there is considerable reason why cultural 
variety and differences can translate into novel stories, messages, music, designs, and so 
forth with large scope for niche development (Cowen, 2002).    
Yet the overarching reason to expect creative industries to be more significant in 
developing nations is simply that the demands of dynamic coordination are greater during 
periods of sustained and rapid growth and change. Refining this hypothesis somewhat, 
the creative industries can be both a source of economic growth (model 3) as well as a 
mechanism of evolutionary coordination services (model 4), but this will only occur 
when ‘standard’ economic growth mechanisms of global trade, capital investment and 
growth focused institutions have already become effective (Chow, 1997).15 It is only at 
this point that ‘creative industries economics’ applies. Prior to that, we are dealing 
routinely with a world of model 1 in which political-economy theory still reigns. No 
economic benefit accrues to the development of media and communication if this does 
not then furnish information or facilitate the discovery of opportunities. And if not, then 
this is rightly the world of overt political engagement and critique. Yet with institutional 
evolution, that focus not only at some point stops being true, but actively reverses. The 
reason for this is that an economic system is, at base, a communication system: indeed, 
markets are highly efficient communication systems that carry, in a single pointed 
                                            
15 This hypothesis also implies that the creative industries would not be significant in all developing nations, but only 
ones with ongoing and sustained growth processes. In nations developing more sporadically and slowly, such as in 
parts of West Asia and East Africa, we would expect to observe less demand for their ‘dynamic coordination’ services.  
 19
message – a price – a vast compact of information about local and global scarcities, 
demands and opportunities. Communication systems thus carry not just socio-political 
messages, but also economic ones. Economic messages can run on the same channels as 
socio-political messages, and freedom and effectiveness in one means freedom and 
effectiveness in the other.            
The creative industries are, in this hypothesis, of greatest value in a world of 
change. In a static economy, the creative industries revert to the entertainment industries. 
Entertainment is of course a valuable good, even a sublime human achievement. But the 
creative industries have specific functional value to economic dynamics when viewed as 
a form of ‘attention infrastructure’ and ‘communications infrastructure’ to facilitate and 
coordinate processes of change. The media and communication industries may thus be of 
similar significance as science and technology industries as an enabler of the process of 
economic development through their contribution to the economic and socio-cultural 
innovation systems.  
 
Digital literacy & economic development 
Arguments for the promotion of various ‘literacies’ often proceed from the perspective of 
their effect on cultural, social and political aspects of participation and inclusion. This 
simultaneously emphasizes their public good aspects and their role in education. The 
specific notion of digital literacy refers to the development of ICT skills and 
competencies in relation to (generally internet based) navigation, expression, 
consumption, understanding and production of digital media. Digital literacy is 
increasingly argued to be a crucial requirement for active participation in a ‘knowledge 
society’ and ‘information economy’ including, specifically, the creative industries. 
Indeed, public support of the creative industries is broadly synonymous with public 
support for digital literacy.  
 Beyond social, cultural and political dimensions, the economic case for digital 
literacy is straightforward and uncontroversial in developed nations: it is, in essence, a 
basic capability for participation in the modern economy. However, the case for priority 
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public support of digital literacy in developing economies is less clear on opportunity 
cost grounds: namely, where public education and infrastructure resources are heavily 
constrained and competing with other development priorities (public health, roads, etc) 
the marginal value of digital literacy is often viewed as considerably lower. Digital 
literacy is thus viewed as a luxury public good, not a basic necessity. Yet is this correct?  
   The argument for its lowered priority is plain: there are better things to direct 
scarce resources to that will yield higher immediate payoffs. However, the pay-offs to 
public support of digital literacy might not be immediate or, worse, might seem to 
promote only frivolous uses – e.g. downloading, blogging, searching.16 Yet the case can 
also be made that digital technologies enable the by-passing of inefficient and 
dysfunctional market and coordination institutions with respect to for example, price and 
auctions, payments, finance, market information, and so forth. This enables the self-
organization of economic coordination outside of political and regulatory systems that 
may be partially or significantly dysfunctional, as well as with respect to underdeveloped 
market institutions (as in the example of guanxi above). There is, therefore, the potential 
of digital literacies to enable the direct by-pass of dysfunctional institutions and to seed 
the development of, and promote the demand for, more efficacious institutions of 
economic coordination. Digital literacy, in other words, may actually be a fast-track for 
economic development rather than a luxury public good.  
This does raise the question of the extent to which this actually requires public 
commitment or is best left to market incentives. However, it is here that the equity and 
inclusion issue re-emerges, and specifically in relation to the economic costs of absence 
of access and capabilities in respect of a ‘digital insider’ class (i.e. the reason guanxi is 
not an efficient solution). Economic and socio-political dimensions neatly overlap here 
for the same reason as discussed above, namely that socio-cultural and political 
information flows over the same channels and networks as economic information, and 
thus what is good for one is good for the other. The same digital literacy that promotes 
cultural and political inclusion also fosters economic self-organization. Digital literacy is 
widely perceived as an amusing additional benefit in developed nations (Shirky, 2008; 
                                            
16 This is to say nothing of the potential spur to intellectual property piracy (Potts,in press-c). 
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Leadbeater, 2008) with quixotic political status. Yet it may well be a serious foundational 
advance for developing nations and a potentially powerful lever of development policy.                      
 
Conclusion 
This paper has argued, via a contextually unscheduled tour of economic growth theory, 
that the cultural, creative, media and communications industries play an important, 
although widely unappreciated, role in growth processes in general and in China in 
particular. Moreover, this role and process is important in the socio-cultural development 
of Chinese identity and society through its rapid economic changes. I have argued that 
these ‘two developments’ are the outcome of co-evolutionary dynamics and have 
insinuated that ‘harmonious and civil society’ is an evolutionary process outcome.  
The upshot was that media and communications theory and economic growth 
theory are more closely related than either side has thus far admitted. There are potential 
gains from trade to be had at this analytic juncture that pointedly involve the substitution 
of ‘evolutionary economics’ for ‘political-economy’ in cultural and media analysis of 
developing economies (Cunningham, 2006; Hartley, 2008). This argument then 
proceeded to how economic development actually works in terms of economic theory, 
rather than as a premeditated conception of how it ought to work in political-economy 
theory. I have argued that economic growth theory does offer significant insight into the 
media and communications dimensions of political and socio-cultural practice in the 
specific context of China’s ongoing transformation.   
The Chinese economy is growing as neoclassical economic growth theory 
predicts: increased investment and global trade is translating into increased output. Yet 
that does not, in itself, explain the full logic of China’s economic growth. For the central 
point is that China is not just growing, but transforming and evolving as a socio-cultural, 
institutional and economic system (Herrmann-Pillath, 2006; Keane & Hartley, 2006; 
Liao, 2006). And as China so changes, it will increasingly require and demand the 
evolutionary services of information, communication and media industries. As growth 
turns to evolution as ‘made in China’ becomes ‘designed in China’ (Keane, 2007), and as 
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design and fashion in China becomes mainstream (Hartley & Montgomery, 2008), the 
media, communications and creative industries will continue to develop as leading and 
driving components of China’s modern, and increasingly post-modern, economy.  
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